Abstract-This paper proposes a cooperative demand response (CDR) scheme for load management in smart grid. The CDR scheme is formulated as a constrained optimization problem that generates a Pareto-optimal response strategy profile for consumers. Comparing with the noncooperative response strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) obtained from the one-shot demand management game, the Pareto-optimal response strategy reduces the electricity costs to the consumers. We further develop an incentivecompatible trigger-and-punishment mechanism to avoid the noncooperative behaviors of the selfish consumers. Furthermore, the CDR scheme is applied to achieve load management of industrial refrigerated warehouses. To implement the CDR scheme in largescale systems, we group the refrigerated warehouses into clusters and utilize the CDR scheme within each cluster. Numerical results demonstrate that the CDR scheme can reduce the electricity costs, drop the electricity prices, and curtail the total energy consumption in comparison with the noncooperative demand response scheme. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
D
EMAND response (DR) is defined as the changes in electricity usage by end-use consumers in response to the power grid needs from electricity markets [1] . In general, there are two categories of DR schemes: 1) incentive-based scheme; and 2) price-based scheme [2] . The incentive-based scheme includes direct load control, interruptible programs, demand bidding, emergency DR, capacity markets, and ancillary services markets. For the direct load control programs, the energy provider manages the loads of the participating consumers directly [3] - [5] . In the interruptible programs, the consumers receive the incentive payments or rate discounts so as to reduce their predefined values [6] . In the demand bidding programs, the consumers bid on specific load reductions and curtail their loads according to the amount specified in the bid [7] , whereas in the emergency DR programs, the participating consumers are paid for measured load reductions under the emergency conditions [8] . Capacity market programs require the consumers to provide predefined load reductions as needed [9] , and ancillary services programs are designed to provide regulation or load following services [10] . For the price-based DR scheme, the energy provider adjusts the loads by flexible pricing, such as critical peak pricing [11] , real-time pricing [12] , and regulation pricing [13] . To support the DR, an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is developed to collect the energy consumption and announce the electricity price [14] , [15] .
Typically, there are two types of consumers for pricebased DR: 1) price-taking (PT) consumers [16] - [18] ; and 2) price-anticipating (PA) consumers [19] - [25] . The PT consumers assume that their energy consumption cannot affect the electricity price, whereas the PA consumers believe that their energy consumption can change the electricity price. In general, the PA consumers refer to large energy consumers such as industrial facilities, commercial buildings, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), and data centers. It was proved that both the industrial facilities and the commercial buildings have large potential in DR [26] - [28] , the PHEVs can provide DR by charging or discharging [29] , [30] , and the data centers can be used to achieve DR via pricing approaches [31] - [33] .
Recently, game theory has been used for studying the DR of PA consumers. For example, noncooperative games were utilized to study the cost minimization of interactive consumers [19] - [21] and the charging control of plug-in electric vehicles [22] , [23] . Stackelberg games were employed to model the interactions between the consumers and the utility companies [24] , [25] , [34] . In fact, neither the Nash equilibrium nor the Stackelberg equilibrium are Pareto optimal in the two game models. Generally, the Pareto optimality is used for evaluating the efficiency of resource allocation in economic systems. If the resource allocation in any economic system is not Pareto optimal, there is potential to improve the Pareto efficiency. Repeated game was utilized to improve the Pareto efficiency for the DR of PA consumers [35] . However, two critical problems have not been addressed: How to detect the noncooperative behavior and what is the punishment strength to stop the noncooperative behavior? In [36] , the cooperative demand response (CDR) was achieved by using the repeated game, and a punishment mechanism was designed to avoid the noncooperative behaviors of the buildings. Furthermore, the noncooperative behavior detection method was developed, and the punishment strength was given to stop the noncooperative behavior under accurate measurable data. In this study, the CDR scheme is formulated as a social optimization problem. Specifically, the punishment mechanism is developed under inaccurate measurable data, and the DR scheme is applied to achieve load management of industrial refrigerated warehouses. The novelty of this work is twofold. 1) We study the noncooperative behavior detection with missing measurable data and give the optimal detection threshold to minimize the loss of social optimality. 2) We propose a cluster-based method to transform the social optimization problem to several suboptimization problems and obtain a suboptimal solution of the social optimization problem. This paper is organized as follows. Some preliminaries are given in Section II. In Section III, the CDR is formulated as a social optimization problem, and the socially optimal response strategy is obtained. In Section IV, an incentivecompatible trigger-and-punishment mechanism is developed to avoid the noncooperative behaviors of the selfish consumers. In Section V, the CDR scheme is applied to achieve load management of industrial refrigerated warehouses with heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, and a heuristic method is developed to obtain the suboptimal response strategy by grouping the refrigerated warehouses into different clusters. Numerical results are given in Section VII, and conclusions are summarized in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Noncooperative Game and Nash Equilibrium
Definition 1: [37] A noncooperative game is defined as a triple G = {N , (S i ) i∈N , (U i (l)) i∈N }, where N = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of active players participating in the game
is the set of possible strategies that player i can take, and U i (l) is the payoff function.
Definition 2: [37] For a noncooperative game
. . , l N ) denotes the set of strategies selected by all the players except for player i,
. . , l N ) denotes the strategy profile, and U i (l i , l −i ) is the resulting payoff of the player i given the strategies of the other players.
B. Taguchi Loss Function
Definition 3: [38] The Taguchi loss function captures the cost to society due to the manufacture of imperfect products. The loss function is defined as
where y is the value of quality characteristic,ŷ is the desired value of y, V is the loss in dollars, and τ is a constant coefficient. The Taguchi loss function defines the relationship between the economic loss and the deviation of the quality characteristic from the desired value. For a product with desired valueŷ,ŷ ± Δ 0 denotes the deviation limit at which some countermeasures must be undertaken. Assuming the cost of countermeasure is A 0 atŷ + Δ 0 orŷ − Δ 0 , we define the constant τ as
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a demand management system composed of an energy provider and several consumers, as shown in Fig. 1 . The energy provider can adjust the loads by periodically announcing the pricing curve to the consumers. We assume that the price is affected by the energy consumption of the consumers, i.e., PA consumers. According to the updated electricity price, the consumers can adjust their energy consumption to reduce the electricity costs. The electricity costs are composed of two parts: 1) the discomfort costs; and 2) the payments. Generally, the discomfort costs are increased with the change from normal energy consumption and can be denoted as a continuous, increasing, and convex function, 1 such as the quadratic function [16] , [21] , [39] , [40] , the logarithmic function [41] , [42] , 1 The PA consumers generally refer to industrial or commercial consumers that have continuous aggregate loads. the power function [43] , and the weighted linear function [44] , [45] . The discomfort cost function is defined as V q i (l i ,l i ), and the electricity payments of consumer i are denoted as
where N = {1, 2, . . . , N} denotes the set of consumers, i denotes the index of consumer,l i is the normal energy consumption, l i is the actual energy consumption, l = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l N } is the strategy profile, and p(l) is the announced electricity price, which is assumed to be an increasing function of the total energy consumption. Then, the electricity costs to consumer i can be defined as
The discomfort costs and the electricity payments usually conflict with each other, and the consumers need to make a tradeoff between them. It is shown from (5) that the energy consumption of one consumer can change the electricity price and further affect the electricity costs to the other consumers. Thus, the DR can be formulated as the following noncooperative game.
Definition 4: (One-shot demand management game) A oneshot demand management game is defined as a triple G = {N , (S i ) i∈N , (U i ) i∈N }, where N = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of active consumers participating in the game, S i is the set of possible strategies that consumer i can take, and
The stable solution of the one-shot demand management game is the Nash equilibrium, which can be obtained from
Generally, the Nash equilibrium is not a Pareto-optimal solution, and thus it is possible to improve the payoffs of all the consumers simultaneously. 2 Next, we develop a CDR scheme to improve the Pareto efficiency of Nash equilibrium. The CDR scheme is formulated as a social optimization problem for all i ∈ N . Since the price is related to the energy consumption of all the consumers, the objective function of (P1) is a multivariable function. The condition for the concavity of the objective function is dependent on the concavity of the Hessian matrix
where U = i∈N U i . In general, H is not negative definite, and the constraints cannot contribute to a convex set. Therefore, the optimization problem (P1) is nonconvex, and the optimal solution l c is hard to obtain. In Section V, we will develop a heuristic method to obtain a suboptimal solution that meets the constraints in (P1).
In the CDR scheme, some of the consumers are possible to improve their payoffs by taking the noncooperative strategies when the other consumers keep cooperative. We assume that some of the consumers (i ∈ N d ) take the noncooperative strategies while the other consumers (j ∈ N c ) keep cooperative, where N d is the set of noncooperative consumers and N c is the set of cooperative consumers. Then, the energy consumption of the noncooperative consumers can be obtained from
where
is the price when some of the consumers take the noncooperative strategies and 
and the payoffs of the cooperative consumers are denoted as
For example, the noncooperative consumer can increase its payoff (9) by taking the noncooperative strategy when all of the other consumers keep cooperative, Therefore, each consumer has the motivation to take the noncooperative strategy, and the socially optimal energy consumption is not a stable solution in one-shot DR.
Remark 1: To compare the CDR scheme for PA consumers with the DR scheme for PT consumers, we give the formulation of PT consumers. The electricity cost to consumer i is denoted as
where p t is a constant price for PT consumers. Minimizing the electricity costs to consumer i, we obtain the optimal energy consumption l * i from dV
We also define the utility function U
Remark 2: In practice, the discomfort cost function may be a combination of multiple step functions. In that case, we can employ the continuous convex function to approximate it and obtain the optimal energy consumption for the consumers. Then, the suboptimal strategy can be obtained by approximating the optimal energy consumption to the step value.
Remark 3: In the problem formulation, we assume the consumers are all adaptable. In practice, the demand management system may include nonadaptable consumers, which do not adapt to the price, i.e., the energy consumption of the nonadaptable consumers arel i , independent of the price. The nonadaptable consumers will increase the total loads and thus the price, because the price is an increasing function of the total loads. The increased price will further reduce the energy consumption of the other adaptable consumers.
IV. TRIGGER-AND-PUNISHMENT MECHANISM
To make the socially optimal energy consumption stable, we consider giving punishments to the consumers if they adopt the noncooperative strategies. In that case, the consumers will care more about the long-term electricity costs. The average electricity costs to consumer i over multiple time slots are defined asV
where k is the index of the time slot and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, which denotes how the consumers discount their future costs. In that case, the consumers not only value the current electricity costs but also the future electricity costs. Therefore, each consumer needs to keep a good reputation to avoid the increased costs in the future. Similarly, we define the average payoff function of consumer i
Next, we will develop a trigger-and-punishment mechanism to avoid the noncooperative behaviors. All of the consumers are assumed to adopt the cooperative strategies in the first time slot. In the subsequent time slots (i.e., k ≥ 2), the cooperation will be maintained if all of the consumers adopt the cooperative strategies in the previous time slot. If the energy provider observes noncooperative behaviors in the previous time slot, it will keep the consumers noncooperative during the subsequent T time slots and restart the cooperation at the (T + 1)th time slot. There are two questions to be answered in designing the trigger-and-punishment mechanism: How the energy provider detects the noncooperative behaviors and what is the punishment strength that can stop the noncooperative behaviors? In the subsequent sections, we will answer these two questions and omit the time slot index k without causing confusions. 
A. Noncooperative Behaviors Detection
The noncooperative behaviors of the consumers will change the electricity price and the total energy consumption. In this section, we utilize the change of the total energy consumption 3 as the indicator of the noncooperative behaviors that exist in the demand management system. The change of the total energy consumption is defined as
In practice, the total energy consumption is measured by the energy provider based on the AMI. It is shown that the missing meter data cause errors to the measurement of the total energy consumption [46] , [47] . As shown in [46] - [48] , the change (i.e., the errors in the measurement) of the total energy consumption can be assumed to follow a normal distribution N (μ, σ 2 ), where σ is the standard variance, μ = 0 if there does not exist any noncooperative behavior, and μ = ΔL if there exist noncooperative behaviors.
To detect the noncooperative behaviors of the consumers, we define the detection rule aŝ
where η is the detection threshold andq is the detection result. Specifically,q = 1 denotes that the energy provider detects the noncooperative behaviors, andq = 0 denotes that the energy provider does not detect any noncooperative behavior. As shown in Fig. 2 , the detection rule (15) causes false alarm and false detection. The false alarm occurs when the noncooperative behaviors are detected in the demand management system that does not have any noncooperative behavior, and the false detection occurs when the noncooperative behaviors are not detected in the demand management system that has noncooperative behaviors. Both the false alarm and false detection have large influences on the accuracy of the noncooperative behaviors detection and thus the social optimality of the CDR scheme. Next, we will give the optimal detection threshold to minimize the loss of social optimality. Proposition 1: Assuming that the probability, with which one consumer performs noncooperative behavior, is α at time slot T 0 , the average loss of social optimality due to the false alarm and false detection is minimal if
where η max and η min are the maximal and minimal detection thresholds, and α c is denoted as
with
. Proof: Given that the probability with which one consumer performs noncooperative behavior is α, the probability of the noncooperative behaviors that occurs in the demand management system can be denoted as 1 − (1 − α) N . We set the indicator q = 1 when there exist noncooperative behaviors and q = 0 when there does not exist any noncooperative behavior. Then, the false alarm probability can be defined as
and the false detection probability can be defined as
where Φ(η) is a decreasing function of η and Ψ(η) is an increasing function of η. Under the detection rule (15), the loss of social optimality due to the false alarm (i.e.,q = 1, q = 0) or the false detection (i.e.,q = 0, q = 1) is denoted as
In (20) , the first part is the loss of social optimality due to false alarm and is defined as the sum of the loss of social optimality in each time slot with punishment, because the punishment strategy is to make all the consumers adopt the noncooperative strategies (i.e., Nash equilibrium) in the subsequent T time slots. The second part is the loss of social optimality in the next time slot due to the false detection of noncooperative behaviors in the current time slot. Given the false alarm probability and the false detection probability, the average loss of social optimality is denoted as
In (21), β = E[q] represents the probability, estimated by the energy provider, that there exist noncooperative behaviors in the demand management system and it can be calculated by
Since Φ(η) is decreasing and Ψ(η) is increasing with η, we conclude that β is decreasing with η. Assuming η min ≤ η ≤ η max , we have β min = f (η max ) and β max = f (η min ). To minimize the average loss of social optimality (21), we obtain the optimal detection threshold:
The critical condition (23) indicates that there exists a critical probability of the noncooperative behaviors (i.e., α c ) such
It is shown in (17) that α
c is decreased with the number of consumers. In practical demand management system, the number of consumers is very large such that α c is extremely small. Therefore, η = η max is always the optimal threshold.
B. Punishment Strength
Suppose all of the consumers adopt the cooperative strategies, the average payoff of one consumer is denoted as
The average payoff of the consumer when adopting the noncooperative strategy at time slot T 0 is denoted as
To make the socially optimal energy consumption stable and achieve the incentive compatibility of the trigger-andpunishment mechanism, there should beŪ
from which, we can obtain the lower bound of the discount factor δ min and the minimal duration of punishment T min . The period of the punishment can affect the implementation of the CDR mechanism. If the period is too short, the punishment mechanism cannot stop the noncooperative behavior. However, if the period is too long, the cooperative consumers will suffer a great deal from the punishment. Therefore, there exists an optimal period that can stop the noncooperative behavior without imposing too much cost on the cooperative consumers. The optimal period can be obtained by rounding up the minimal duration of punishment, i.e., [T min ]+1.
V. APPLICATION TO LOAD MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL REFRIGERATED WAREHOUSES
In this section, we consider the application to load management of industrial refrigerated warehouses with HVAC systems. Changing the cold storage temperature set points of the refrigerated warehouses will cause the reduction of product quality and further increase economic costs to the industrial consumers. Taguchi loss function is a method that captures economic costs due to the manufacture of imperfect products [38] . According to Definition 3, the economic costs can be defined as
where γ i is the cost coefficient,
denote the actual temperature set point and the desired temperature set point in time slot k, respectively. The indoor temperature of refrigerated warehouse i evolves according to the following linear dynamics [18] :
where ω i and θ i specify the thermal characteristics of the operating environment and the HVAC system, Q
) models the heat transfer, θ i l i (k) (θ i > 0) models the energy-heat transformation of the HVAC system. Assuming that the refrigerated warehouse i requiresl i (k) kWh energy to maintain the desired indoor temperature, we havê [49] . Substituting (28) and (29) into (27) and omitting the time slot index k, we transform the cost function to
The electricity price is defined as
where λ is a pricing parameter to implement elastic pricing, p 0 is the base price, and L is the forecast demand. Then, the costs to refrigerated warehouse i can be denoted as
with which, (P1) is a nonconvex optimization problem, and the global optimal solution is hard to obtain. Next, we propose a heuristic method to search for the suboptimal solution of (P1) and group the refrigerated warehouses into M clusters. The number of refrigerated warehouses in cluster m (m ∈ M = {1, 2, . . . , M}) is N m , and the set of refrigerated warehouses in cluster m is denoted as N m = {1, 2, . . . , N m }. The details of the cluster-based CDR scheme are given as follows. The refrigerated warehouses are first grouped into M clusters according to their normal energy consumptionl i . Specifically, assuming that the highest and lowest normal energy consumption are l max and l min , respectively, the refrigerated warehouses belong to cluster m if their normal energy consumption lies within
The forecast demand is allocated to each cluster according to the ratio of the total normal energy consumption in one cluster to the total normal energy consumption in the demand management system, i.e.,
where L m is the forecast demand of cluster m. Similarly, the CDR scheme in cluster m can be formulated as
(34) To solve (P2), we first consider the following unconstrained optimization problem:
Next, we give the condition to guarantee a unique global optimal solution of (P3).
Proposition 2:
Given the payoff function U m i defined by (34) , the optimization problem (P3) has a unique global optimal solution if
Proof: Given U m i defined by (34) , the Hessian matrix of (P3) is denoted as
Given (35), it is sufficient to show that H is strictly diagonally dominant, i.e.,
Following Gershgorin's theorem [50] , all the eigenvalues are negative, and H is a negative definite matrix. Therefore, the optimization problem (P3) is convex and has a unique global optimal solution.
Supposing the condition (35) is satisfied, we can obtain the optimal solution of (P3), i.e.,
where C is defined by
. . .
Next, we will check the feasibility of the constraints of (P2). If any constraint of (P2) is not satisfied, the energy provider will increase the number of clusters from M to M + 1 and reallocate the energy consumption to the refrigerated warehouses according to (38) until all the constraints of (P2) are satisfied. The clustering algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. The number of clusters obtained by Algorithm 1 is a minimal value to guarantee that the constraints of (P2) are satisfied. In practice, the number of clusters can be larger than this minimal value. The impact of the number of clusters on the performance of the CDR scheme will be studied in the simulations. Calculate the energy consumption l c according to (38) ; (33) ; Calculate the energy consumption l c for the refrigerated warehouses in cluster m according to (38) ; end for g = 0;
The clustering algorithm is terminated; end if end while
In each cluster, we introduce a cluster head that is responsible for setting the electricity price within the cluster and allocating the energy consumption to the refrigerated warehouses using the CDR scheme, as shown in Fig. 3 . When the cluster head observes the change in the total energy consumption from the normal value, it will investigate the reasons for the change, such as the noncooperative behaviors or the detection errors. If the change is caused by the noncooperative behaviors of the refrigerated warehouses, the cluster head will announce the start of the punishment to all the refrigerated warehouses in the next time slot and restart the cooperation after at least T min time slots. In practice, to obtain the socially optimal energy consumption, the energy provider needs to periodically measure the energy consumption and collect the parameters (e.g., θ i ) from the refrigerated warehouses. However, the information update is not frequent because of large communication overhead. The infrequent communications will further make the energy provider harder to distinguish the noncooperative behaviors from the errors in the total energy consumption. In the simulations, it is shown that the clustering method can benefit the detection of the noncooperative behaviors and reduce the motivations of the refrigerated warehouses to adopt the noncooperative strategies. 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the performance of the CDR scheme is evaluated. We assume that the normal energy consumption of the refrigerated warehouses is uniformly distributed in [100 kWh, 150 kWh], the cost coefficients γ i θ 2 i are uniformly distributed in [2, 4] or [3, 5] , the base price p 0 is 0.05$/kWh, the forecast demand is estimated by L = μ i∈Nl i , and the pricing parameter λ is calculated by λ = 2/N or λ = 1/N .
A. Comparison With Related Works
Assuming that the number of refrigerated warehouses is 100, the cost coefficients γ i θ 2 i are uniformly distributed in [2, 4] , and the pricing parameter λ is calculated by λ = 2/N , we compare the proposed CDR scheme with the DR scheme for PT consumers and the noncooperative demand response (NDR) scheme for PA consumers in Table I . It is shown that the proposed DR scheme reduces the electricity price, 4 the total costs, 5 and the total energy consumption effectively. To evaluate the total cost reduction (TCR) of the refrigerated warehouses obtained from the proposed CDR scheme, we define the TCR as
where U when compared with the NDR scheme for PA consumers. As shown in Fig. 4 , the TCR obtained from the proposed DR scheme increases with the number of refrigerated warehouses and starts to saturate when the number of refrigerated warehouses is larger than 60. 
B. CDR With and Without Noncooperative Behavior
To evaluate the cost reduction of the refrigerated warehouse when adopting the noncooperative strategy, we define the cost reduction due to the noncooperative behavior (CRN) as
To evaluate the increase of total energy consumption when a refrigerated warehouse adopts the noncooperative strategy, we define the total energy consumption increase due to the noncooperative behavior (EIN) as
Assuming that one refrigerated warehouse has the noncooperative behavior and the other refrigerated warehouses keep cooperative, the electricity price, the average costs, and the total energy consumption are all increased, as shown in Table II . Furthermore, we study the impact of the number of refrigerated warehouses on the performance of the CDR scheme. The cost reduction of the refrigerated warehouse that has the noncooperative behavior increases with the number of refrigerated warehouses, as shown in Fig. 5 , and the increase in the total energy consumption decreases with the number of refrigerated warehouses, as shown in Fig. 6 is also shown that the noncooperative refrigerated warehouse has relatively large cost reduction and thus strong motivation to adopt the noncooperative strategy, and the increase in the total energy consumption in the demand management system is relatively small when the number of refrigerated warehouses is large. Thus, it is hard to distinguish the noncooperative behavior from the errors in the total energy consumption. To solve this problem, we divide the refrigerated warehouses into different clusters.
C. Cluster-Based CDR
Assuming that the number of refrigerated warehouses is 100, we study the impact of the number of clusters on the performance of the CDR scheme. The total costs to all the refrigerated warehouses with clustering are given in Fig. 7 . It is shown that the total costs increase with the number of clusters, which indicates that the clustering reduces the social optimality (i.e., the negative total costs) of the CDR scheme. The loss of social optimality is evaluated in Fig. 8 . It is shown that the loss of social optimality is bounded by 1.4% of the optimal costs when the number of clusters is less than 10, and thus the clustering gives a suboptimal solution. As shown in Table III , the TCR obtained from cooperation also decreases with the number of clusters. Assuming that a refrigerated warehouse has the noncooperative behavior and the other refrigerated warehouses keep cooperative, the cost reduction of the noncooperative refrigerated warehouse decreases with the number of clusters, and the increase of the total energy consumption increases with the number in clusters. It is shown that clustering can be helpful for detecting the noncooperative behavior and reducing the motivation of the refrigerated warehouses to adopt noncooperative strategies. If there is no clustering, i.e., fully decentralized management, the problem becomes NDR. In Table I and Fig. 4 , we have compared the proposed scheme with the noncooperative scheme in terms of the total costs, the total energy consumption, and the price.
D. Noncooperative Behavior Detection and Punishment
As shown in Fig. 9 , the critical probability decreases with the number of refrigerated warehouses. Specifically, even when the number of refrigerated warehouses is 10, the critical probability is smaller than 0.06%, which indicates that η max is always the optimal detection threshold, 6 because the number of refrigerated warehouses in the demand management system is larger than 10 and thus α > α c is satisfied almost everywhere. Furthermore, it is also shown in Fig. 9 that a larger λ gives a lower critical probability and a larger γ i θ 2 i gives a higher critical probability. Assuming that one refrigerated warehouse has the noncooperative behavior, we study the minimal duration of punishment (i.e., T min ) and the lower bound of the discount factor (i.e., δ min ) under different parameter settings. As shown in Fig. 10 , the minimal duration of punishment decreases with the discount factor because the future costs play a more significant role in the average costs and thus less duration of punishment is needed to stop the noncooperative behavior. It is shown in Table IV that a larger λ gives a higher T min and δ min , and a larger γ i θ 2 i gives a lower T min and δ min .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we formulate the CDR scheme as a constrained social optimization problem. It is shown that the CDR scheme reduces the electricity price, the total costs, and the total energy consumption comparing with the NDR scheme. We design the trigger-and-punishment mechanism to keep cooperation and avoid the noncooperative behaviors of the PA consumers. We develop the method to detect the noncooperative behavior and establish the condition on the duration of punishment to stop the noncooperative behavior. The CDR scheme is further applied to achieve load management of industrial refrigerated warehouses with HVAC systems. We propose a clustering algorithm to obtain a suboptimal solution of the nonconvex optimization problem. Specifically, the refrigerated warehouses are grouped into different clusters that are managed by the cluster heads. The CDR scheme is executed within each cluster. It is shown that the clustering method can help with the detection of noncooperative behaviors and reduce the motivation of the consumers to adopt noncooperative strategies.
